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PREFACE:
FIGHTING BIG SISTER FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
NADINE STROSSEN*
Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex,
an institution of gender inequality. . . . [P]ornography,
[w]ith the rape and prostitution in which it participates, . . .
institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy ... 1
Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Feminists have many different views of sexually-explicit
expression. A growing number believe that efforts to restrict
such materials . . . [are part of] a continuing effort to control
women's sexual expression and women's lives. These feminists
are passionate in their belief that if efforts at restriction were
successful, they-women-would be the losers.
The rights of women to speak out and think freely and to
fight for their basic rights, to control their lives, their bodies, and
to have economic and political equity are at stake-not merely
whether sexually-explicit expression should exist.2
National Coalition Against Censorship,
Working Group on Women, Censorship
and "Pornography"
The strain of anti-pornologism is hardly what's distinctive
about feminism; whereas, anti-anti-pornology-the critique of the
anti-porn movement on grounds other than constitutional
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. The themes presented in this Introduction are more extensively explored in
NadineStrossen, A Feminist Critique of "he" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1099 (1993) [hereinafter Strossen I], and will be further developed in a book,
to be published by Scribner in January 1995, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex,
and the Fight for Women's Rights.
For research assistance with this essay, I am indebted to Stephen Hendricks,
Thomas Hilbink, Carolyn D. Richmond, Karen Shelton, and Donna Wasserman.
1. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321,
325-26 (1984).
2. National Coalition Against Censorship, Women, Censorship, and "Pornography"
13-14 (Feb. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York Law School Law
Review).
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formalism or First Amendment pietism-is a distinctive feminist
contribution.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
Chairman, Department of Afro-American Studies,
Harvard University
This -historic Symposium issue of the New York Law School Law
Review takes a major step toward righting an imbalance that has marred
recent academic discussions about sexual speech. Led by University of
Michigan Law Professor, Catharine A. MacKinnon, and author Andrea
Dworkin, many feminists on campuses around the country have endorsed
various measures to suppress sexual expression that is allegedly
"subordinating" or "degrading" to women, based on the theory that such
expression promotes misogynistic discrimination and violence.4 Labeling
this category of sexual speech "pornography," ostensibly to distinguish it
from "obscenity"-the differently defined category of sexual speech that
the Supreme Court has held to lack First Amendment protection-these
feminists have had an enormous impact on public perceptions and public
policy.6
MacKinnon's arrogant assumption that there is only one feminist view
about what she calls "pornography" has unfortunately permeated media
coverage and public consciousness. Too many journalists, government
officials, and members of the public wrongly assume that if you are a
feminist-or even a non-feminist woman-you therefore support
3. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., To 'Deprave and Corrupt', 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
401, 438 (1993) (book review).
4. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography
and Equality, 8 HARv. WOMn'S L.J. 1, 24 (1985) (setting forth the text of the Model
Anti-Pornography ordinance introduced by Dworkin and MacKinnon); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
1-2, 22-60 (1985) (in the ordinance MacKinnon and Dworkin proposed, they define
"pornography" as, inter alia, "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women
through pictures and/or words").
5. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth a tripartite test for
proscribable "obscenity": "(a) whether the 'average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value") (citations
omitted).
6. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1114-27.
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restrictions on sexual speech.7 This simplistic, distorted view of feminist
approaches to the critically important and complex subjects of speech, sex,
discrimination, and violence may well be a major factor accounting for the
widely-noted recent backlash against the women's rights movement.'
Some of the negative stereotypes that have been used unfairly to discredit
advocates of feminist causes generally, including that feminism is anti-sex
and anti-male,9 do, however, fairly characterize the views of MacKinnon,
Dworkin and other anti-"pornography" feminists.' 0
The view of the National Coalition Against Censorship's Working
Group on Women, Censorship, and "Pornography"" belies the
widespread misperception, propounded by MacKinnonites and perpetuated
by the media, that feminists generally seek to restrict sexual speech.
Several other organizations also oppose restrictions on "pornography"
specifically on feminist grounds, including the U.S.-based Feminist Anti-
Censorship Taskforce and Feminists for Free Expression.12 Additionally,
as indicated by the Symposium contributions by Avedon Carol from Great
BritainP3 and Thelma McCormack from Canada, 4 anti-censorship
feminists in other countries have also banded together to oppose censoring
sexual speech. These anti-censorship groups are supported by many
prominent feminist activists, artists, authors, educators, scholars, and
scientists, as well as experts on sexuality, gender-based discrimination,
and violence.
7. See id. at 1107-08 & n.24.
8. See, e.g., SusAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
A'hffICAN WOMUN46 (1991) (noting that the recent backlash against the women's rights
movement is a "recurring phenomenon ... [that] returns every time women begin to
make some headway toward equality").
9. See generally id.
10. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1147-51.
11. The Working Group and its members consistently put the term "pornography"
in quotation marks to underscore that it is not a legal term of art with a precise, accepted
meaning, but rather, a label for an intractably vague category of sexual expression,
calling for inescapably subjective, and hence arbitrary, judgments. Indeed, in striking
down a law reflecting the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-"pornography" analysis, Judge Sara
Evans Barker concluded that the central term "pornography" was so opaque as to render
the law void for vagueness. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316,
1337-39 (S.D. Ind. 1984), af#'d, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986).
12. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1109-11.
13. See Avedon Carol, Don't Get Fooled Again: Assailed in Britain, 38 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 183 (1993).
14. See Thelma McCormack, Censorship in Canada, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 165
(1993).
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Although many influential feminists have consistently resisted all calls
for suppressing sexual speech "for their own good," their position has not
been as widely disseminated as that of their pro-censorship counterparts.
The mainstream media, as well as academic publications, have emphasized
the pro-censorship, MacKinnonite faction of feminism, thus fostering the
misperception that all or most feminists adhere to it. 5 Precisely to
counter this misperception, the National Coalition Against Censorship
formed the Feminist Working Group on Women, Censorship, and
"Pornography" in 1992, which organized a conference on "The Sex
Panic" in 1993.16
To counter the disproportionate circulation of the pro-censorship
feminist perspective specifically in the crucially important academic
sector,17 the New York Law School Law Review published this signally
important Symposium issue, which contains speeches that were presented
at "The Sex Panic" conference, and additional articles that well represent
the broad range of anti-censorship feminist analyses. This novel collection,
which includes classic previously published works, as well as many
original contributions, constitutes a powerful response to the shibboleth
that censoring "pornography" would counter misogynistic discrimination
or violence. This timely compendium demonstrates that many feminist
scholars in legal and other disciplines, as well as artists and activists, have
reached precisely the opposite conclusion.
It is particularly distressing that the feminist pro-censorship position
has been so influential within the academic world, notably the legal
academic world, where one would expect values of free speech and
gender-based equality to be especially cherished. The feminist anti-
"pornography" faction has become disturbingly fashionable at elite law
schools in recent years. Its views have been dominant in faculty
appointments and promotions and have been prominently featured in some
important conferences at prestigious law schools, in law journal
publications, and certain law school courses, such as those on feminist
jurisprudence."8
15. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1107-08, 1114.
16. The conference was co-sponsored by The Women's Center of the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York and The Vera List Center of the New School
for Social Research.
17. See FALUDI, supra note 8; Nadine Strossen, Legal Scholars Who Would Limit
Free Speech, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 7, 1993, § 2, at BI [hereinafter Strossen II].
18. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1108 & n.29; Strossen II, supra note 17. See
also Maijorie Heins, A Public University's Response to Students' Removal of an Art
Exhibit, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1993); Carol Jacobsen, Anti-Porn Feminism v.
Feminist Art: Notes on the Censorship of Pom'im'age'ry: Picturing Prostitutes, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63 (1993) (describing the impact of the pro-censorship feminist
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For example, recent surveys of all legal publications that discuss the
feminist controversy over sexual expression, conducted by research
assistants under my supervision, revealed that a majority of these writings
advocated censorship, and that virtually all written from a feminist
viewpoint did so."9 Consequently, even the substantial law review
literature that refutes the MacKinnon-Dworkin analysis does not
successfully counter the prevalent misimpression that feminist values
weigh in favor of censoring "pornography."
It is precisely this crucial missing element in the legal literature that
this Symposium amply supplies. For, unlike the vast majority of the prior
law journal publications confronting the pro-censorship feminist theories,
the contributions to this volume meet MacKinnonism on its own
ground-that of gender equality and women's rights. Rather than relying
solely on conventional free speech analysis, and thus appearing to shore
up the MacKinnonites' claim that free speech values are at odds with
faction at the University of Michigan Law School, where Catharine MacKinnon is a
professor); Leanne Katz, Introduction: Women, Censorship, and "Pornography", 38
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 9, 16-18 (1993) (describing a conference at the University of
Chicago Law School which was dominated by pro-censorship feminists).
19. See Strossen I, supra note *, at 1107-08 & n.26-28. The survey was initially
conducted in 1992 by Carolyn D. Richmond, and updated in 1994 by Stephen Hendricks.
Law review publications examining the Dworkin-MacKinnon approach to
"pornography" were located pursuant to the following search request, conducted on June
27, 1994 on both LEXIS and WESTLAW: "porn! w/20 censor! and date after 1980."
Additionally, a manual search was conducted of articles in the Current Law Index and
the Index ofLegal Periodicals. These searches yielded 172 articles, notes, and comments
(book reviews and book review essays were not included). Of those 172, 54 focused on
the "pornography" controversy (the remaining 118 contained only short, passing
references to this controversy, and therefore were not included in the literature survey).
Additionally, eight other relevant publications were located through footnote references
in writings that had been identified through the forementioned searches, bringing the total
number of pieces reviewed to 62.
Of the 62 relevant pieces reviewed and classified as to their positions on the
MacKinnon-Dworkin approach to "pornography," 32 endorsed that approach, 25 opposed
it, and five took no position on it.
Of the 25 law review pieces that opposed the MacKinnon-Dworkin approach, 20
were based on classic free speech analysis and only five on feminist analysis: Cheryl
Smith Blum, The Place of Art in Catharine MacKinnon 's Feminist Legal Theory, 19 J.
CoNrEMP. L. 445 (1993); Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting
Pornography in Its Place, 17 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 359 (1987); Susan Etta Keller,
Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEo. L.J. 2195 (1993);
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Mainstream
Radical Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123 (1992); and Nadine Strossen,
A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1993).
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equality values, the authors of this Symposium provide new rationales for
resisting censorship, expressly froma women's-rights-centered orientation.
Professor Gates highlights the intellectual importance of the novel,
gender-equality-focused anti-censorship perspectives that pervade this
Symposium.' He correctly states that the anti-"pornography" feminists
tread no new intellectual ground. They have simply supplied some
superficially new rhetoric to describe what analysis reveals to be, at
bottom, conventional, traditional, conservative positions." Some analysts
have persuasively explained that the pro-censorship feminist philosophy
reflects profoundly reactionary views of sexuality and gender.3 For
example, Professor Jeanne L. Schroeder's article powerfully plumbs the
deep resonances between MacKinnon's views and medieval Catholic
theology.2
In contrast to the ultimately unoriginal nature of the pro-censorship
feminist analysis of "pornography," the anti-censorship feminist analysis
that is so richly represented in this Symposium does offer significant new
insights into the ever-important subjects of sex, gender, and speech. In
Professor Gates's words, "the critique of the anti-porn movement on
grounds other than constitutional formalism or First Amendment pietism
... is a distinctive feminist contribution."2
The disturbingly great academic support for suppressing sexual speech
is integrally related to the recently increased academic support,
particularly in the legal academy, for suppressing "hate speech," or
expression that conveys racial, religious, sexist, and other forms of
bias.' Indeed, the MacKinnon-Dworkin concept of "pornography" is a
species of hate speech because it is defined in terms of its alleged
discrimination against women.
The academic champions of restricting hate speech and "pornography"
share a common constitutional philosophy: that free speech and equality
are inevitably in tension with each other, and that in order to advance
equality, we consequently have to cut back on free speech. This view has
been stated, for example, both in Catharine MacKinnon's latest book,
20. See Gates, supra iote 3.
21. See id. at 440; Strossen I, supra note *, at 1114-16, 1164-66.
22. See Strossen I, supra note*, at 1147-51 (noting that the pro-censorship feminist
philosophy, which implicitly emphasizes that sex is inherently degrading to women, is
similar to the traditional stereotypes of women).
23. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Catharine's Meek. MacKinnon's Pornography
Analysis as a Return to Traditional Christian Sexual Theory, 38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
225 (1993).
24. Gates, supra note 3, at 438.
25. See Strossen 11, supra note 17.
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Only Words,' and in a recent book of essays supporting the restriction
of hate speech, Words that Wound,2 by law professors Kimberl%
Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence H, and Mar J. Matsuda.
The essays in this Symposium expose the fallacies in the foregoing
"either-or" constitutional philosophy, and thus make a distinctive
contribution to an important ongoing debate. A number of legal scholars
recently have responded to the "speech-versus-equality" analysis by
explaining that free speech and equality are mutually reinforcing, rather
than inalterably opposing values in the contexts of the hate-speech
debate s and other current controversies.29  In parallel fashion, the
essays in this Symposium explicate the positive interrelationship between
free speech and equality in the context of the "pornography" debate.
Drawing upon legal analysis, history, and a wide range of other scholarly
disciplines, as well as personal experience, the writings in this volume
convincingly demonstrate that women-along with all human beings-are
entitled to both free speech and equality, and that we cannot enjoy one
without the other.
The women and men who have contributed to this Symposium are as
dedicated as any other feminists to eradicating violence and discrimination
26. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (arguing that because
"pornography" subordinates women, courts should weigh women's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights against First Amendment rights when considering
laws restricting "pornography"). MacKinnon also argues that pornography does not
deserve First Amendment protection because it involves actions, which are often
coercive, rather than the mere expression of ideas. Id.
27. MAR13. MATSUDA LHF AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993) (arguing that racially-
motivated insults should not be protected by the First Amendment and that courts that
have found that such speech is protected do so because they have failed to consider the
history of racial oppression and its victims).
28. See NADINE STROSSEN HF AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKNG OF SEX: HATE
SPEECH, CIVIL RiGHTS, & CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994) (responding to the arguments made
in Matsuda et al.'s Words That Wound); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Why Civil Liberties
Pose No Threat to Civil Rights, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37; Donald
E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessonsfor the Post-Brown
Era, 46 VAND. L. REV. 865 (1993); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the
First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991); Wiliam B. Rubenstein, Since
When Is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality?: Some Reflections on the
Construction of the "Hate Speech" Debate From a Lesbian/Gay Perspective, 2 LAW &
SExUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 19 (1992); Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L. REV. 484.
29. SPEECH AND EQUALITY: Do WE HAVE TO CHOOSE? (Gara LaMarche ed.,
forthcoming Fall 1994) (discussing issues based on a conference held at New York
University School of Law); Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality:
the American Civil Liberties Union Past, Present and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 143 (1994).
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against women; indeed, many of us work directly for these goals every
day of our lives. We believe, though, that suppressing sexual words and
images will not advance these crucial goals. To the contrary, we are
convinced that censoring sexual expression would actually do more harm
than good in terms of women's rights and safety. Therefore, we adamantly
oppose any effort to restrict sexual speech not only because it would
violate our cherished First Amendment freedoms-our freedoms to read,
think, speak, sing, write, paint, dance, dream, photograph, film and
fantasize as we wish-but also because it would undermine our equality,
our status, our dignity, and our autonomy.
Women should not have to choose between freedom and safety,
between speech and equality, between dignity and sexuality. Women can
be sexual beings without forsaking other aspects of our identities. We
insist on the right to enjoy the thrills of sex and sexual expression without
giving up our personal security. We can exercise our free speech and our
equality rights to denounce any sexist expressions of any sort-including
sexist expressions that are also sexual-rather than seeking to suppress
anyone else's rights.
Women's rights are far more endangered by censoring sexual images
than they are by the sexual images themselves. Women do not need the
government's protection from words and pictures. We do need, rather,
to protect ourselves from any governmental encroachment into our
freedom and autonomy, even-indeed, especially-when it is allegedly
"for our own good." As former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
cautioned: "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.... The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by [wo]men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding."'
While expressing a dazzling diversity of perspectives and experiences
in other respects, the contributions to this Symposium are all united by a
central common belief-that the feminist pro-censorship movement is a far
greater threat to women's rights than is the "pornography" it condemns.
For women who cherish liberty and equality, "Big Sister" is as
unwelcome in our lives as Big Brother.
30. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1927) (Brandeis, I., dissenting).
[Vol. 38
